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collective bargaining modify the impact of exports 
and imports on wages? In a seminal paper, Calmfors 
and Driffill (1988) show that, in firms covered by firm‑level 
wage agreements, wages are better linked to productivity 
than in firms covered by industry‑level agreements. 
Gürtzgen (2009) lends support to these predictions using 
data for German manufacturing firms.
Our study looks at data from individual French 
firms on wages, exports/imports and collective 
bargaining over the period 2005‑2009. Our sample 
comprises more than 8,000 firms (among the largest 
French exporters/importers) which account for over 
two thirds of French exports and imports of manufactured 
goods. Using micro‑econometric techniques, we examine 
two questions: (i) do exporting and offshoring lead to higher 
wages and, if so, is the effect heterogeneous across 
workers? (ii) to what extent does wage bargaining shape 
the effect of trade on wages? 
International trade favours exports but also creates opportunities 
for offshoring. This Rue de la Banque studies the impact of firm-level 
trade activities on wages, as well as the role of collective bargaining. 
Both exports and offshoring have a positive impact on wages, but 
exports increase wages for all occupational categories, while the 
impact of an increase in offshoring is stronger for executives. 
The elasticity of wages with respect to exports and offshoring is 
positive and is higher for firms with collective bargaining. However, 
we find that collective bargaining reduces only moderately wage 
inequalities induced by offshoring.
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Trade, wages, and collective bargaining
1 See Harrison, McLaren and McMillan  (2011) for a recent 
literature survey.
How are wages impacted by international trade? From a theoretical viewpoint, access to new export markets leads to an increase in revenues that might 
translate into higher wages. Theoretical studies highlight 
an a priori ambiguous effect of offshoring on wages. 
On the one hand, using cheaper goods produced abroad 
might improve the efficiency of the production process, 
which can then lead to higher wages. On the other hand, 
offshoring may allow firms to replace output previously 
produced by local workers, exerting downwards pressure 
on wages, especially those of unskilled workers whose 
production can be more easily substituted by offshoring.1 
Thus, offshoring can potentially have heterogeneous 
impacts across occupations. Empirical analyses of data 
for other developed economies such as the United States 
or Denmark (e.g. Hummels et al., 2014) support these 
hypotheses. Detailed studies of the French case are scarce.
The case of France is of interest because, as in most 
countries in Continental Europe, the majority of French 
workers are covered by collective wage agreements, 
either at firm level or at industry level (or both). How does 
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This econometric analysis shows that the effect of 
exports and imports on average wages is indeed positive 
and statistically significant (see Carluccio, Fougère 
and Gautier, 2015).
The effect of exports and offshoring on wages varies 
across worker categories. Chart 2 plots the firm‑level 
average hourly wages of blue‑collar workers and executives 
against percentiles of the distribution of exports or 
offshoring per employee.
The average hourly wage of blue‑collar workers ranges from 
EUR 12 for the least intensive exporters (bottom decile) 
to more than EUR 14 for the most intensive exporters 
(top decile – a wage premium close to 20%). Blue‑collar 
workers’ wages vary much less with offshoring, rising 
from EUR 12.1 to EUR 12.8, or by 5%. The results of 
an “all other things being equal” econometric analysis 
confirm these results: for blue‑collar workers, the wage 
gain associated with exports is positive and statistically 
significant, while the gain associated with offshoring is 
nil or slightly negative.
Both exports and offshoring positively affect the wages of 
executives. The average hourly wage of executives ranges 
Firm-level data
We use a quasi‑exhaustive sample that contains nearly the 
universe of French firms participating in international trade. 
Firm‑level imports and exports come from the French Customs 
Office, and are broken down by firm and by year. We merge 
these data with several administrative sources (balance‑sheet 
data, wages, and collective wage agreements). The wage data 
includes hourly wages for each firm with at least one employee 
in France. Wages are reported as an average both for the firm 
and for each of the following occupations: ‘Administrative and 
commercial executives (including engineers)’, ‘Technicians and 
supervisors’, ‘White‑collar employees’, ‘Production (blue‑collar) 
workers’. The Ministry of Labour data provide information on 
wage agreements signed at firm and industry levels for each firm 
and year. The balance sheet data provide information on the 
main sector of activity, the number of employees and the level 
of sales. We use these data to estimate total factor productivity.
Statistical analyses reveal that trade participation is a firm‑level 
characteristic that is quite stable over time: around 70% of 
French firms show zero values for exports or imports during 
the period 2005‑2009, and around 20% report positive 
exports or imports each year. In addition, most exporters are 
also offshorers and vice‑versa. In order to obtain a sample 
composed of firms with similar characteristics, in our analysis 
we keep only those firms that both export and import in each 
year that they appear in the sample. This allows us to study 
how a variation in the value of exports or imports (the “intensive 
margin”) relates to wages.
2 Dividing the amount of exports and imports by the number of 
company employees reduces the wage differences due to the 
firm size effect.
C1 Average hourly wage by export and offshoring volume 
per worker (percentile of the overall distribution)
(x axis: percentile of offshoring and export distributions ; y axis: wage in euros)
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Sources: DGDDI, Insee, authors’ calculation.
Note: The average hourly wage in euro is reported as a function of 
percentiles of the export and offshoring distributions. Exports and offshoring 
per employee are used to control for wage differences due to differences 
in firm size. Percentiles are computed over our sample distribution 
and the average hourly wage is calculated for each percentile of the export 
and import distributions.
What is the impact of international trade 
on wages? 
Chart 1 plots firm‑level average hourly wages against 
percentiles of the distribution of exports or offshoring 
per employee.2 The positive correlation is quite clear: 
firms that trade more intensively tend to pay higher 
wages. For example, hourly wages are around EUR 15 
for the lowest exporters (those in the bottom decile of 
the distribution) versus EUR 19 for the largest exporters 
(those in the top decile). The same phenomenon is 
observed in the case of offshoring: the more intensively 
a firm imports, the higher the average wages it pays. 
The above relationship might be caused by hidden factors 
that are correlated with international trade. Therefore, 
it is important to conduct an “all other things being 
equal” analysis that takes into account the impact of 
other variables that can affect wages, independently 
of international trade (for example, the productivity and 
size of the firm, the local unemployment rate, etc.). 
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from about EUR 29 for those firms that export or offshore 
the least, to over EUR 33 for those with the highest levels 
of exports or offshoring (a 14% increase). These results are 
confirmed by “all other things being equal” econometric 
analyses: for executives, the wage gain associated with 
exports is positive and similar to that of blue‑collar workers, 
whereas wage gains due to offshoring are positive and 
higher than those for blue‑collar workers.
Overall, trade has a positive impact on the wages paid 
by French firms that export and import. Wage gains from 
exporting are similar across worker categories, whereas 
offshoring results in wage gains that are unevenly 
distributed across worker types.
Does collective bargaining shape the impact 
of trade on wages?
As in many European countries, most French wages are set 
through, or influenced by, collective bargaining at industry 
or firm level (see Avouyi‑Dovi, Fougère and Gautier, 2013). 
In France, wages can be set at three different bargaining 
levels: (i) at national level, a binding minimum wage is 
set by the government according to a specific formula;3 
(ii) at industry level, employers’ organisations and 
workers’ unions bargain over wage scales for specific 
occupations; (iii) at firm level, employers and unions 
usually bargain over wage increases. There is a strict 
hierarchy between the different levels of wage bargaining: 
a collective agreement must set forth, broaden or enhance 
an agreement which has previously been signed at a higher 
bargaining level. Over the period from 2005 to 2009, 
about 75% of the firms in our sample were covered by 
an industry agreement each year, and about 20% were 
covered by a firm‑level agreement.4
Figures 3 and 4 show the average wages of blue‑collar 
workers and executives according to firm’s export 
and offshoring intensities and for three different wage 
bargaining regimes: no agreement, industry‑level 
agreement, and firm‑level agreement. Wage gains 
stemming from the signature of firm‑level agreements 
accrue to all worker categories, regardless of trade 
intensity. The wage gap between firms covered by a firm 
agreement and those covered by an industry agreement 
is approximately 10%. Wage gains associated with 
industry‑level agreements (relative to a situation with no 
wage agreement of any kind) accrue only to blue‑collar 
workers, and they are rather weak (close to 2%).5
The wage‑bargaining premia vary according to export 
and offshoring intensities. For blue‑collar workers, 
the wage gain associated with firm‑level agreements 
(compared to industry agreements) increases with the 
level of exports and offshoring per worker. It is slightly 
3 Industry‑level agreements alter the collective agreement which 
codifies in an industry working conditions, wages and certain social 
guarantees. Collective agreements and industry‑level agreements 
are often extended by ministerial decree to all firms and employees 
in the sector concerned.
4 These firms are also very often covered by an industry‑level agreement.
5 André (2012) and Luciani (2014) use information on all French firms, 
and find a firm‑level agreement wage premium of 5% (compared 
to an industry‑level‑only agreement). Dahl et al. (2013) find similar 
results for Danish firms.
C2 Average hourly wage by export and offshoring volumes 
per worker (percentile of the overall distribution)
(x axis: percentile of offshoring and export distributions ; y axis: wage in euros)
Blue‑collar workers
11.0
11.5
12.0
12.5
13.0
13.5
14.0
14.5
15.0
0 105 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Executives
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
0 105 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Exports
Offshoring
Sources: DGDDI, Insee, authors’ calculation.
Note: The average hourly wage in euro is reported as a function of 
percentiles of the export and offshoring distributions. Exports and offshoring 
per employee are used to control for wage differences due to differences 
in firm size. Percentiles are computed over our sample distribution 
and the average hourly wage is calculated for each percentile of the export 
and import distributions. 
4Rue de la Banque
No. 16 ■ January 2016
less than 10% in the firms that are low exporters or 
low offshorers, and almost 15% for the most intensive 
exporting or offshoring firms. Wage gains associated 
with industry‑level agreements (compared to no 
agreement) increase with offshoring but less steeply. For 
executives, the wage gain associated with a firm‑level 
agreement is positive, but decreases slightly at high 
levels of export and offshoring intensity, which might 
suggest that firm‑level wage agreements are favourable 
to blue‑collar workers.
Our econometric estimations provide broad, but not 
complete, support to these statements. The elasticity 
of wages to exports is higher in firms that frequently 
sign firm‑level agreements, both for blue‑collar workers 
and executives. The elasticity of blue‑collar wages to 
offshoring is negative in the absence of an agreement, 
and becomes positive when the firm is covered by an 
industry or firm‑level agreement. However, we do not find 
any significant differences in wage gains associated with 
collective agreements across worker categories.
C3 Average hourly wage by export volume per worker 
(percentile of the overall distribution)
(x axis: percentile of export distributions; y axis: wage in euros)
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Sources: DGDDI, Insee, authors’ calculation.
Note: The average hourly wage in euro is reported as a function of 
percentiles of the export and offshoring distributions. Exports and offshoring 
per employee are used to control for wage differences due to differences 
in firm size. Percentiles are computed over our sample distribution 
and the average hourly wage is calculated for each percentile of the export 
and import distributions. 
C4 Average hourly wage by offshoring volume per worker 
(percentile of the overall distribution)
(x axis: percentile of offshoring distributions; y axis: wage in euros)
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Note: The average hourly wage in euro is reported as a function of 
percentiles of the export and offshoring distributions. Exports and offshoring 
per employee are used to control for wage differences due to differences 
in firm size. Percentiles are computed over our sample distribution 
and the average hourly wage is calculated for each percentile of the export 
and import distributions. 
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